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Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the performance consequences of employee stock options for a
broad sample of firms during the period 1996-1999. Our tests are performed separately for
the  top  5  executives  and  all  other  employees.  We  estimate  the  expected  level  of  option
incentives  based  on  each  firm’s  economic  characteristics.  We  examine  the  association
between the unexpected level of option incentives and firm performance as measured by
future abnormal returns, future return on assets, and current and future firm value (Tobin’s
Q). We find consistent evidence that firms with unexpectedly high levels of option incentives
exhibit significantly higher levels of firm performance. The results hold for both Executives
and Employees and are consistent across each of our three measures of firm performance. 
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1. Introduction
In return for giving up part of their equity stake in the firm, shareholders expect to
receive a number of benefits from providing their employees with stock options, including
reduced  agency  costs  and  higher  levels  of  incentives,  as  well  as  recruiting  and  retention
benefits. While economic theory suggests that option-based incentives will be used until they
reach the point where their marginal benefit equals their marginal costs, it is not clear that this
equilibrium is always obtained in practice (Core and Guay, 2001). In addition to the possibility
that managers may use their power to extract economic rents, the difficulty of forecasting and
quantifying  the  expected  benefits  from  options  implies  an  unclear  relation  between  stock
option incentives and firm performance. Using a wide variety of methodologies, prior research
provides  mixed  evidence  on  the  relation  between  equity-based  incentives  and  firm
performance.1 This paper empirically explores the relation between option-based incentives
and firm performance for both executive and non-executive employees.
The use of options as a method to provide incentives has generated considerable
controversy. Recent enormous growth in the use of options has amplified this controversy.
Such growth encompasses the number of firms granting options, the number and value of
options  granted,  and  how  far  down  the  organizational  ladder  they  are  granted  (Murphy,
1999). The controversy revolves around a central question: Do shareholders benefit when
employees hold stock options? The answer is of fundamental importance to issues relating to
corporate governance, financial reporting, and regulatory policies. 
To  provide  evidence  concerning  this  question,  we  analyze  the  role  of  option
incentives, which are defined as the change in the dollar value of an option for a 1% change in
stock price. Rather than the value of options held or granted, we use the incentive value of
options  in  our  tests  (Core  and  Guay,  1999,  2001),  since  we  expect  that  it  is  an  option’s
sensitivity  to  stock  price  which  determines  its  incentive  effects,  and  hence,  value  to
shareholders. To control for the endogenous nature of compensation plan design, we base our
analyses on the unexpected level of option incentives. The unexpected level is measured as the
residual from a first stage regression that predicts the expected level of option incentives as a
function of the firm’s economic characteristics.2 The residual represents the extent to which a
firm’s employees hold more or fewer option incentives compared to the average level for
similar firms.
1 For example, Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) show that firm performance (measured
as Tobin’s Q) is first increasing and then decreasing with managerial ownership.  Himmelberg et al. (1999)
and Palia (2001) find no evidence that equity-based incentives for top executives and directors are related to
firm value.
2 A similar approach is taken in Core and Guay (1999, 2001), Hanlon et al. (2003), and Ittner et al. (2003).With  few  exceptions,  the  prior  literature  has  focused  on  the  performance
consequences of equity-based incentives for the CEO and/or top level executives (Core et al.,
1999;  Core  and  Larcker,  2002;  Himmelberg  et  al.,  1999;  Mehran,  1995).3 For  two  main
reasons,  we  focus  on  the  role  of  option-based  incentives  for  both  the  top  5  executives
(Executives) and all other employees (Employees). First, since just over 75% of all options
are held by Employees for the median firm in our sample, a study examining the performance
consequences of options held by just the top executives would be substantially incomplete.
Second, as Section 6 discusses, the expected relation between option incentives and firm
performance will vary depending on whether Executives or Employees hold the options and
on the underlying process that determines the level of option incentives. Separately analyzing
the performance consequences associated with each group provides evidence on how firms
determine the levels of option incentives. Therefore, all of our tests distinguish between the
unexpected level of option incentives held by Executives and Employees.
Our empirical tests are based on a large and well-diversified sample of firms (2,479
firm-years representing 727 individual firms) over the 1996-1999 period. We perform three
sets of complementary analyses to assess the relation between firm performance and the level
of unexpected option incentives. The first set of tests examines the association between the
unexpected level of option incentives and the level of abnormal returns over the next 30
months after controlling for the three factors in Fama and French (1993) and a momentum
factor. The second set of tests uses Tobin’s Q as the measure of firm performance, while the
third set relies on an accounting-based measure of performance: the future return on assets
(ROA). To the extent that results for the market-based and accounting-based performance
measures  agree,  it  increases  our  confidence  that  neither  measurement  error  nor  model
specification errors drive our results. 
Our results consistently show that firm performance is significantly and positively
related to the extent to which both Executives and Employees hold more option incentives
than  the  average  firm  with  similar  economic  characteristics.  We  find  that  a  portfolio
composed of firms ranked in the highest quintile of unexpected option incentives held by
Employees  (Executives)  has  equally-weighted  monthly  abnormal  returns  that  are  78  (36)
basis points higher than a comparable portfolio composed of firms in the lowest quintile.
These differences are significant at the 1% and 10% level, respectively. We find that firms in
the highest quintile have significantly higher current and one year ahead values of Tobin’s Q
compared  to  firms  in  the  lowest  quintile.  Additionally,  firms  in  the  highest  quintile
experience  significantly  higher  accounting  ROA  over  the  following  one  and  two  years
compared to firms in the lowest quintile. The Tobin’s Q and ROA hold regardless of whether
the amount of unexpected option incentives is based on option incentives held by Executives
or Employees. 
While our empirical methodology is designed to yield reliable and robust results, a
number of factors could still render them spurious. Since we only examine the incentive
effects of options, our results may be biased to the extent that the determinants of other forms
of  equity-based  incentives  differ  from  the  determinants  of  option-based  incentives.  The
validity of our results also depends on our cross-sectional models of option incentives being
correctly specified. While we have attempted to control for the economic determinants of
option incentives, we cannot rule out the possibility of some omitted variable(s) that is (are)
correlated both with firm performance and the incentive residual, causing our results to be
spurious.  By  historical  standards,  our  sample  period  is  characterized  by  extremely  high
2
3 Ittner et al. (2003) and Core and Guay (2001) are notable exceptions.average stock returns. If the higher returns represent market mispricing and the extent of
mispricing is increasing with the level of unexpected option incentives, our results may not
extend to other time periods. However, additional evidence discussed in Section 5 indicates
that this scenario is unlikely. 
The next section discusses several methodological issues that are important to our
study while Section 3 discusses our sample. Section 4 develops our measures of the expected
level  of  option  incentives.  Section  5  presents  our  empirical  evidence  on  the  association
between the unexpected level of option incentives and firm performance. In Section 6, we
discuss how our empirical evidence accords with alternative economic theories that explain
how option incentives are determined within firms. Section 7 summarizes and concludes the
paper.
2. Methodological issues
In this section, we discuss several methodological issues that must be addressed in
order to assess the relation between option incentives and firm performance reliably. These
issues include the time period over which we measure performance, methods to control for
the endogenous nature of compensation plan design, and the question of whether to control
for unobserved heterogeneity using firm fixed effects.
If markets are fully efficient and can perfectly infer the performance consequences
of employee incentives, then an analysis of short-run returns around the announcement of an
employee stock option program would be an appropriate means to determine the relation
between  firm  performance  and  option-based  incentives.  Many  early  studies  in  the
compensation literature adopt this approach, including Brickley et al. (1985) and DeFusco et
al.  (1990).4 Generally,  these  studies  find  small  but  significantly  positive  excess  returns
around the adoption of an equity-based incentive program. 
We  doubt  that  the  market  is  fully  and  immediately  able  to  anticipate  all  of  the
performance consequences of a stock option plan, and expect that the announcement date
abnormal returns only represent a fraction of the total market response. Perhaps the main
reason for questioning whether stock prices immediately reflect options’ full performance
implications  is  that  relatively  little  historical  data  guides  investors  about  their  expected
performance consequences. Murphy (1999) reports that it was increasingly common for firms
to  adopt  broad-based  option  plans  during  our  sample  period.  Hall  and  Liebman  (1998)
describe  the  sustained  and  rapid  growth  over  the  past  few  decades  in  equity-based
compensation for executives. Given the novelty of broad-based option plans, it is doubtful
that  the  market  could  correctly  anticipate  their  long-term  impact  on  performance.5
Additionally,  the  continuing  debates  about  the  value  of  options  to  risk-averse  employees
(Carpenter, 1998) and the claims that granting options is an inefficient means to provide
incentives (Hall and Murphy, 2003) suggest that the performance consequences of options are
3
4 Two main shortcomings characterize this approach.  First, it can be difficult to identify the precise date(s) on
which the market becomes aware of the new compensation plan.  Second, the adoption of the plan may be
driven by contemporary conditions at the firm, which yield both the decision to adopt the compensation plan
and the market’s reassessment of the firm’s future performance.
5 The fierce debates in the business press about whether stock options are beneficial to shareholders and the
appropriate accounting treatment for stock options further suggest that options’ long-term impact on firm
performance is unclear.  For example, see Bryant (1998), McGough (2000a, 2000b), and Morgenson (1998).at least initially unclear. Instead, stock prices partially incorporate the expected economic
effects of incentives when they are granted, and the market updates its assessment regarding
the  optimal  level  of  option  incentives  slowly  over  time  as  it  learns  more  about  their
performance consequences. 
By examining the effects of option incentives on future firm performance, we are
essentially relying on a long-window event study. This approach allows us to discern more of
the total performance consequences of using options as their implications and results become
increasingly transparent over time. Our results will understate the association between option
incentives  and  firm  performance  to  the  extent  that  this  relation  is  reflected  during  the
announcement period. Our analyses notably do not constitute a test of market efficiency
since, as Section 6 explains, economic theories provide no clear prediction of the expected
relation between option incentives and firm performance. 
Another  important  consideration  to  control  for  is  the  endogenous  nature  of
compensation plan design, since economic theory suggests that the level of equity incentives
will be related to the extent of agency problems within the firm (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). If
markets are perfectly efficient and if firms are constantly optimizing with respect to option-
based incentives, then no statistical association should emerge between stock options and
firms’ stock performance once researchers have controlled for the exogenous determinants of
the optimal level of options (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). As Section 4 discusses, we control
for differences in option incentives using a cross-sectional regression model to estimate the
expected level of option incentives. We interpret the residual from this incentive regression as
the unexpected level of option incentives relative to other firms with similar characteristics.6
Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Palia (2001) examine the association between firm
performance (as proxied by Tobin’s Q) and equity-based incentives held by top managers and
CEOs, respectively.7 They argue that the omission of unobservable (to the econometrician)
determinants of managers’ equity and incentive holdings will bias the associated coefficients
in the performance regressions. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using a firm
fixed-effects framework, they find no significant association between managerial holdings of
equity incentives and firm performance. 
In a comment on Himmelberg et al. (1999), Zhou (2001) suggests that controlling
for  firm  fixed  effects  severely  decreases  the  power  of  tests  to  detect  any  performance
consequences of equity-based incentives. Zhou observes that managerial ownership varies
considerably in the cross-section but typically changes quite slowly within a firm across time.
If  managers  maximize  their  long-run  expected  utility,  then  relatively  small,  year-to-year
changes in ownership are unlikely to induce large changes in incentives and hence, large
within-year changes in firm performance. Since using firm fixed-effects essentially removes
all cross-sectional variation from the data, Zhou concludes that the findings in Himmelberg et
al. (1999) (and, by extension, those in Palia, 2001) “do not provide strong evidence against
the  view  that  managerial  ownership  incentives  are  important  for  firm  performance.”
Following Zhou’s argument, we do not control for firm fixed-effects, although we do control
4
6 If firms are always in equilibrium, then the residual simply represents measurement or specification errors
and should not be related to firm performance.  However, a number of factors, such as transaction costs, will
prevent firms from always being in equilibrium.  Consistent with the arguments in Milgrom and Roberts
(1992), we assume that firms in the cross-section will vary with respect to both the optimal aggregate level of
option incentives and the distribution of option incentives within the firm.
7 Himmelberg et al. (1999) examine stock ownership while Palia (2001) examines both stock- and option-
based equity incentives.for  industry  fixed-effects.  To  the  extent  that  unobserved  heterogeneity  exists  within  our
sample, our results must be interpreted accordingly.
3. Sample selection and options data
Our sample is drawn from firms comprising the S&P 500, the S&P Midcap 400, and
the S&P Smallcap 600 as of the end of 1999. To balance the data-gathering costs of hand-
collected  items  with  the  benefits  of  obtaining  a  broad,  widely-representative  sample,  we
include the 400 firms with the highest sales from the Midcap and Smallcap firms that have
December fiscal year-ends in addition to all of the S&P 500 firms. We exclude firm-years
with no options outstanding, with negative book values of equity, and with missing data
items.8 In order to ensure that the financial statement data was publicly available at the time
of portfolio formation (see Section 5), we exclude firms with fiscal years ending in April or
May from the sample. The final sample consists of 2,479 firm-year observations representing
727 firms for the 1996-1999 fiscal years. Consistent with our sample selection procedures,
62% of sample firms come from the S&P 500, and 16% and 22% come from the MidCap and
SmallCap indices, respectively. 
We  hand-collected  information  about  the  details  of  each  firm’s  employee  stock
options  from  the  annual  10-K  reports.  Execucomp  provided  option  data  pertaining
exclusively to Executives. The difference between the total amount and the amounts for the
Executives was used to estimate the option amounts for the Employees. We collected data on
the number and weighted-average exercise price for options outstanding and exercisable at
the end of each fiscal year, along with the weighted-average remaining contractual life for
stock  options  outstanding,  and  exercisable.  We  also  collected  the  number  and  weighted-
average exercise price of options granted during the current year and the expected time to
maturity. Compustat provided accounting data not related to options, and CRSP provided
stock price and return data. Analysts’ forecasts of the long-term growth rate in earnings per
share were obtained from the I/B/E/S Summary files.
Table 1 presents summary univariate statistics of the option variables. To mitigate
any undue influence from outliers, we winsorize all variables used in this study by setting the
bottom (top) one percent of the values equal to the value corresponding to the 1st (99th)
percentile.  The  mean  (median)  firm  has  19.91  (6.18)  million  options  outstanding,  which
represents 7.9% (6.6%) of total shares outstanding. The mean (median) value of outstanding
options,  measured  using  the  Black-Scholes  formula,  is  over  $368  million  ($78  million),
which represents 4.1% (2.8%) of the mean (median) firm’s market capitalization. 
Table 1 also presents information on option holdings separately for Executives and
Employees. The median fraction of option held by Executives (Employees) is approximately
25% (75%) of all outstanding options. The mean (median) top 5 executive holds 624,767
(306,044) stock options that are worth over $10 million ($4 million). While the total number
and value of options held by Employees collectively are much higher than for those held by
the top 5 executives, the amounts per Employee are much smaller given the large number of
employees at the typical firm in our sample.
5
8 Approximately  7  percent  of  firm-years  in  our  initial  sample  have  no  stock  options  outstanding.    In
eliminating these firms, we may introduce a sample selection bias.  To address this possibility, we replicate
our analyses including the inverse Mills ratio from a probit model of firms’ choice to use stock options
(Heckman, 1979).  The results are virtually identical to those reported below.4. The expected level of option incentives
Consistent with Core and Guay (1999, 2001), we measure the incentive value of an
employee stock option as the dollar change in the fair value of the option due to a 1% change
in stock price. We measure the fair value of stock options using the Black-Scholes formula
modified for dividends. Accordingly, the incentive value for a single option is measured as
the option’s “delta” computed at the end of the fiscal year multiplied by 1% of the firm’s end-
of-year  stock  price.9 We  use  the  method  in  Core  and  Guay  (2002)  to  estimate  the
incentives of the entire portfolio of options held by Executives and Employees, respectively,
at the end of each fiscal year. 
We control for differences in the level of option incentives related to the firm’s
economic characteristics using two cross-sectional regression models: one for Executives and
the  other  for  Employees.  We  estimate  separate  models  because,  as  described  below,  we
expect the determinants of option incentives to vary between the two groups of employees.
We scale the total value of option incentives for the entire portfolio of options each group
holds by the number of executives/employees in each group. We take the natural log of the
value because, as Table 2 indicates, the distribution of these values is highly skewed. 
We interpret the systematic portion of the model simply as the average or benchmark
level of option incentives for similar firms. In this context, the residual from the incentive
model  represents  the  extent  to  which  a  firm’s  employees  hold  more  or  fewer  option
incentives than the average firm with similar characteristics. We refer to the fitted values
from  the  two  incentive  regressions  as  the  expected  level  and  to  the  residuals  as  the
unexpected level of option incentives. 
4.1. Economic determinants of option incentives for executives
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that the optimal level of managerial ownership is
positively related to firm size and monitoring difficulty. Smith and Watts (1992) hypothesize
that larger firms require more talented managers who demand higher compensation. Thus, we
expect that size will be positively related to the level of option incentives. Baker and Hall
(2002)  and  Himmelberg  et  al.  (1999)  find  that  the  portfolios  of  top  managers’  equity
incentives increase at a decreasing rate with firm size. Accordingly, our proxy for size is the
log of the firm’s annual sales, log(sales).
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that the amount of noise in the firm’s operating
environment is expected to increase the costs of direct monitoring, which in turn increases
the relative benefits of using option incentives. These costs are expected to increase at a
decreasing  rate  with  the  difficulty  in  monitoring.  Hence,  we  use  the  logarithmic
transformation of the firm’s idiosyncratic risk to control for the effects of employee risk
aversion. Idiosyncratic Risk is defined as the log of the standard deviation of the residual
return from a 36-month market model regression. Consistent with Core and Guay (1999), we
expect the level of option incentives to increase with log(Idiosyncratic Risk).10
6
9 An alternative approach is to measure the dollar change in the fair value of the option for a (thousand) dollar
change in firm value (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Yermack, 1995).  See Baker and
Hall (2002) and Core et al. (2003) for discussions of the distinctions between the two approaches.
10 Additionally, Oyer and Schaefer (2002) suggest that if the variance of employees’ beliefs about the future
value of the options increases with Idiosyncratic Risk, then the number of options granted will increase with
risk.Smith  and  Watts  (1992)  suggest  that  the  firm’s  growth  opportunities  will  be
positively associated with option incentives, since the presence of growth opportunities makes
it more difficult to monitor managerial actions. In addition, options’ incentive and retention
features are especially important for growth firms. Core et al. (1999), Hanlon et al. (2003),
and Ittner et al. (2003) find empirical evidence consistent with a positive association between
growth opportunities and equity-based compensation. We use three variables as proxies for
the firm’s level of growth opportunities: Book to Market, R&D to Sales and Growth Forecast.
Book to Market is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity at the
fiscal year-end, and we expect firms with higher growth opportunities (i.e., lower Book to
Market) to have higher option incentives. R&D to Sales is the ratio of annual research and
development expenditures to sales. Growth Forecast captures the market’s expectations about
the future growth in earnings per share and is measured as the I/B/E/S consensus analyst
forecast of long-term growth in earnings per share. We expect that the use of option incentives
will increase with the intensity of R&D activities and expected earnings growth.
High free cash flow poses a problem for firms with low growth opportunities, since
managers may invest the excess cash in negative net present value projects or engage in
empire-building acquisitions. Jensen (1986) suggests that using stock-based incentives can
mitigate this agency problem. Following Lang et al. (1991) and Core and Guay (1999), our
proxy  to  capture  this  determinant  of  option  incentives,  FCF Problem,  is  the  three-year
average of [(operating cash flow minus preferred and common dividends)/total assets] if the
book-to-market ratio is greater than or equal to one, and zero otherwise. Firms with book-to-
market ratios greater than one are expected to have low growth opportunities.
We include two additional proxies to capture differences in corporate governance,
following the claim in Bebchuk et al. (2002) that managers of firms with weak governance
structures will extract economic rents in the form of additional options. We measure the
quality  of  a  firm’s  corporate  governance  using  the  governance  measure  (Gov. Index)
developed by Gompers et al. (2003). Gov. Index is an inverse measure of shareholders’ rights
based on reports compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).11 Since
the index is not available for 15 percent of the firms in our sample, we use a governance
indicator variable (Gov. Indicator) that is set to one (zero) if the firm-year observation has
(does not have) a governance index value. Consistent with Gompers et al. (2003), we expect
Gov. Index to be positively associated with option incentives.
4.2. Economic determinants of option incentives for employees
The prior literature suggests that many of the same determinants shape the level of
option  incentives  for  Employees  as  for  Executives.  Accordingly,  we  include  Size,
Idiosyncratic Risk, Book to Market, R&D to Sales, and Growth Forecast in the Employee
incentive model. We do not expect the free cash flow problem to affect the use of option
incentives for Employees since we only expect this to pertain to the firm’s top executives.
Likewise,  the  relative  ability  of  top  executives  to  extract  rents  for  themselves  should  be
unrelated  to  the  level  of  option  incentives  provided  to  non-executive  employees.
Accordingly,  we  do  not  include  FCF Problem,  Gov. Index,  and  Gov. Indicator in  the
Employee incentive model.
7
11 Since Gov. Index in not available each year, we align Gov. Index for 1995 with option data for 1996, Gov.
Index for 1998 with option data for 1997 and 1998, and Gov. Index for 2000 with option data for 1999.  This
procedure should not bias the results since Gov. Index exhibits little time series variation (Gompers et al.,
2003).We include five additional variables that we expect to determine the level of option
incentives per employee. Following Core and Guay (2001), we assume that the number of
growth  options  per  employee  (Growth Options per Employee)  reflects  the  importance
of human capital in capturing the firm’s growth opportunities. This variable is defined as the
difference between the market and book values of equity, divided by the total number of
Employees. We expect that the retention aspects of options provide more benefits in settings
where  human  capital  is  relatively  more  important  in  exploiting  available  growth
opportunities.
Option incentives cause employee wealth to vary with aggregate firm performance,
as reflected by its stock price. We expect that the relation between employee wealth and
aggregate firm performance will vary with employee monitoring costs and the benefits of
aggregate performance measures (Bushman et al., 1995; Core and Guay, 2001; Smith and
Watts, 1992). Bushman et al. (1995) find that aggregate performance measures are used less
frequently  when  product  and  geographic  diversification  are  high,  and  are  used  more
frequently in firms with high levels of intersegment sales. We use the Bushman et al. (1995)
entropy measures to proxy for product diversification and geographic diversification. Product
Diversification is measured as ∑Pilog(1/ Pi), where Pi is the dollar sales of principal product
i scaled by total sales. Geographic Diversification is measured as ∑Gi log(1/ Gi), where Giis
the dollar sales for geographic segment i scaled by total sales. Our proxy for operational
interdependencies (Intersegment Sales) is defined as intersegment sales scaled by total net
sales. We expect that the use of option incentives is decreasing in the extent of product and
geographic diversification and is increasing in the importance of intra-firm trade (Core and
Guay, 2001). Since, however, the extent of geographic diversification is also a proxy for firm
decentralization – which calls for more option incentives – the expected relation between
Employee option incentives and Geographic Diversification is ambiguous. 
While the above variables are designed to capture the systematic determinants of
option  incentives,  certain  firm-specific  determinants  are  not  reflected  in  these  variables.
Consistent with Core and Guay (2001), we expect these firm-specific determinants to also
determine the level of option incentives held by Executives. Thus, we include the residual
from the Executive incentive model (Executive Residual) to control for these firm-specific
factors and expect it to have a positive coefficient.
4.3 Estimation results for option incentive models
Table  2  presents  descriptive  statistics  for  Executives’  and  Employees’  option
incentives along with the variables in the incentive models described above. The results show
that Executive wealth is significantly tied to stock prices. The mean (median) change in the
fair value of option holdings per executive for a 1 percent change in share price is $161,575
($71,441). The corresponding amounts for each Employee are orders of magnitude smaller in
comparison ($424 and $99, respectively). While this discrepancy partly arises because pay-
to-performance sensitivities are lower for Employees, another substantial part stems from our
inability to determine the percentage of Employees in each firm that actually holds options.
In the majority of firms, only executives and upper level managers are granted options; while
only in a small minority of publicly-traded firms do more than half of all employees hold
options (Blasi et al., 2003). Thus, the values per Employee substantially understate the wealth
effects of stock price changes for the Employees who actually hold options. Consistent with
Table 1’s results that most options are held by Employees, the mean (median) aggregate
option  incentives  held  by  Employees  are  86  percent  (73  percent)  of  the  total  option
incentives.
8We estimate the option incentive models annually to avoid using future information
in the construction of the unexpected level of option incentives. In addition to the economic
determinants discussed above, we include a constant and 55 two-digit SIC industry indicator
variables in each regression in order to control for unmodelled effects on option incentives
unrelated to the hypothesized determinants that may covary with industry membership. For
expositional purposes, we only report the results using the pooled sample in Table 3. 
Table 3 indicates that both the pooled Executive and Employee models have good
explanatory power, with adjusted-R2s of 0.66 and 0.75, respectively. In the Executive model,
five of the eight coefficients are significant, and all of the significant coefficients have the
expected sign. Interestingly, we find no evidence that the quality of corporate governance is
incrementally associated with Executive option incentives. This finding is inconsistent with
the  notion  that  top  executives  exploit  poor  governance  provisions  to  extract  excessive
amounts  of  stock  options.  The  results  for  the  Employee  model  demonstrate  that  each
explanatory variable is significant and has the expected sign. Consistent with Core and Guay
(2001), we find that the sensitivity of employee wealth to stock prices is higher in firms
whose executives hold unexpectedly high levels of option incentives. Overall, our results are
consistent with prior literature in terms of the coefficients’ sign, size, and significance.
5. Option Incentives and Firm Performance
In this section, we empirically examine the relation between option incentives and
firm performance. We use the unexpected level of option incentives, as measured by the
residual from the incentive regressions described in Section 4, to assess the impact of option
incentives on firm performance. Doing so allows us to control the extent to which economic
factors, which capture firms’ characteristics and contracting environment, determine the level
of  option  incentives.  We  do  not  expect  option  incentives  related  to  these  factors  to  be
associated with cross-sectional differences in firm performance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).
We measure firm performance in three different ways: future abnormal returns, the current
and one-year-ahead value of Tobin’s Q, and future accounting return on assets. 
5.1 Unexpected option incentives and future returns
If the level of unexpected option incentives matters for firm performance but the
effects are not incorporated immediately into stock prices, then realized returns will differ
systematically across otherwise equivalent securities. In this section, we examine the relation
between unexpected option incentives and subsequent market returns. 
At the end of each year between 1996 and 1999, we rank firms in decreasing order
by the magnitude of unexpected option incentives held by Executives (Employees) and form
five  portfolios.  Firms  in  the  Top  (Bottom)  portfolio  comprise  the  quintile  with  the  most
(least) unexpected option incentives. We implement the following trading strategy: at the end
of June of 1997, we buy the five portfolios based on unexpected option holdings at the end of
fiscal year 1996 and hold them for 30 months.12 We repeat the strategy in June of 1998, 1999
and 2000. 
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12 Firms with a Compustat fiscal year 1996 by definition closed their books between the end of June 1996 and
the end of May 1997.  We exclude firms with fiscal years ending in April or May so that by the end of June
1997, at least three months have passed since the end of the fiscal year.  This procedure ensures that the data
used to construct the portfolios are publicly available by the portfolio formation date. We examine whether a trading strategy based on the level of unexpected option
incentives generates abnormal returns in excess of those generated by passive investments in
mimicking portfolios of well-known factors that predict stock returns. An advantage of the
calendar-time specification in Eq. (1) compared to other methods of calculating abnormal
returns  is  that  it  not  only  produces  well-specified  test  statistics  –  as  it  takes  the  cross-
correlation  in  stock  returns  into  account  –  but  that  it  also  reflects  the  experience  of  a
hypothetical investor over our sample period (Fama, 1998). 
We  use  the  Fama  and  French  (1993)  three-factor  model  augmented  with  the
momentum factor to control for the expected level of returns (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993;
Fama and French, 1996; Carhart, 1997; Brennan, et al., 1998). The cited empirical evidence
has  shown  that  those  four  factors  exhibit  reliable  power  to  explain  the  cross-section  of
average returns:
Rt= α + β1*RMRFt+ β2*SMBt+ β3*HMLt + β4*UMDt + εt (1)
The dependent variable, Rt, is the equally-weighted (or value-weighted) monthly
return for a portfolio of firms minus the one-month Treasury bill rate. RMRFt (the market
factor) is the month t value-weighted market return minus the month t Treasury bill rate. The
variables SMBt (small minus big), HMLt (high minus low), and UMDt (up minus down) are
the month t returns on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios designed to capture the
size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, respectively.13 While a debate as to whether
these factors are actually priced risk factors persists in the literature, we remain neutral and
simply view the four-factor model as a method of performance attribution. Thus, we interpret
the estimated intercept, α, as the abnormal return in excess of what passive investments could
have  achieved  in  mimicking  factor  portfolios.  Since  we  have  four  years  of  data,  each
regression contains 120 monthly return observations.
Table 4 shows the results of tests designed to assess the impact of the unexpected
level  of  option  incentives  on  future  abnormal  returns  after  controlling  for  well-known
determinants  of  stock  returns.  Panel  A  presents  the  results  for  both  Executives  and
Employees using equally-weighted portfolios when we estimate Eq. (1) separately for each
unexpected  option  incentives  quintile.  Interestingly,  we  find  that  all  of  the  intercepts  are
significantly  positive  (at  the  1%  level),  indicating  that  each  portfolio  earns  significantly
positive abnormal returns beyond what their underlying factors would predict. The first five
rows contain the estimation for each of the five Executive portfolios. The first row indicates
that the abnormal return to buying and holding the Top Portfolio for 30 months generates
abnormal  returns  of  87.1  basis  points  per  month,  or  about  11.0  percent  per  year.  The
intercepts decline monotonically across the five portfolios as the level of unexpected option
incentives  decreases.  The  α coefficient  for  the  Bottom  Portfolio  demonstrates  that  this
portfolio earns abnormal returns of 51 basis points per month on average, or roughly 6.3
percent annually. 
The next row in Panel A, Top – Bottom, shows the return on a zero-investment
strategy  that  buys  the  Top  Portfolio  and  sells  short  the  Bottom  Portfolio.  This  portfolio
generates an average monthly return of 36.1 basis points or 4.4 percent per year, which is
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13 Details on the construction of the four factors can be found in Ken French’s web page from where the
datasets containing the four factors were downloaded
(mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html).  We are grateful to Prof. French for
making the data available.significant at the 10% level (p-value = 0.076). This result indicates that, on average, firms
experience significantly higher returns over the following 30-month period when their top
executives hold unexpectedly high levels of option incentives compared to the average firm
with similar characteristics. 
The bottom half of Panel A presents the analogous results for regressions where
firms are sorted into portfolios based on the level of unexpected level of option incentives
held by Employees. Overall, the results are very similar to, although generally stronger than,
the results for Executives. The estimated value of α declines almost monotonically as one
proceeds from the Top Portfolio to the Bottom Portfolio, and all of the estimated intercepts
are  significantly  positive  at  the  1%  level.  The  intercept  for  the  Top  (Bottom)  Portfolio
indicates that the firms with the most (fewest) unexpected option incentives earn abnormal
returns of 118.4 (40.4) basis points per month, or 15.2 (5.0) percent annually. The last row in
Panel A, Top – Bottom, shows the return on a zero-investment strategy that goes long in the
Top Portfolio and short in the Bottom Portfolio. This portfolio generates an average monthly
return of 78 basis points, or 9.8 percent per year, which is significantly different from zero at
the 1% level. 
The returns on the zero-investment strategy for the Employees are higher than the
returns for the Executives. Such a difference could result if option incentives for Executives
produce a smaller impact on firm performance compared to Employee option incentives. An
alternative  explanation  is  that  the  market  more  accurately  understands  the  performance
consequences of option incentives held by Executives. Most firms instituted option plans for
their top executives many years prior to their extensive use of options for non-executive
employees.14 Since  the  market  has  had  more  time  to  learn  about  the  performance
consequences of option incentives for Executives, it has presumably incorporated more of
this  information  into  stock  prices  for  the  Executives  compared  to  the  Employees  by  the
beginning of the return accumulation period. 
Panel  B  contains  the  results  for  the  same  set  of  regressions  except  where  the
portfolios  are  value-weighted.  The  results  are  similar  to  those  for  the  equally-weighted
portfolios but are generally weaker. All but one of the α coefficients are smaller than their
equally-weighted counterparts. While all of the intercepts are positive, the values are only
significantly different from zero for the top 2 (3) portfolios in the Executive (Employee)
regressions.  Additionally,  the  returns  to  the  zero-investment  portfolios  for  both  the
Executives  and  Employees  are  positive  but  not  significantly  different  from  zero.  The
differences  between  the  equally-weighted  and  value-weighted  results  indicate  that  the
performance consequences of the unexpected level of option incentives are concentrated in
smaller firms.
5.2. Unexpected option incentives and firm value
Another method to assess the performance consequences of option incentives is to
examine their effect on firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is defined as the
market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets
is measured as the sum of the market value of equity measured at the fiscal year end plus the
book value of liabilities. Many studies have adopted this approach, including Demsetz and
Lehn (1985), Lang and Stulz (1994), La Porta et al. (2002), and Morck et al. (1988). 
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14 Additionally, disclosures about option holdings by Employees are much less detailed, making it less likely
that the market has fully impounded this information into stock prices.Since Tobin’s Q measures the present value of expected future cash flows divided by
the  replacement  cost  of  recognized  assets,  there  is  no  need  to  adjust  for  risk  in  the
comparisons of Tobin’s Q across firms or portfolios. However, we must control for other
factors that are expected to affect the level of Tobin’s Q. To ascertain whether cross-sectional
differences in Tobin’s Q are related to the unexpected level of option incentives, we use the
following regression model, where firm subscripts are understood: 
Tobin’s Qt (t+1) = α + β1*Executive Residualt
+ + β2*Executive Residualt
¯
+ β3*Employee Residualt
+ + β4*Employee Residualt
¯ + φ*Controlst + εt (2)
The dependent variable is the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q at time t or t+1 depending
on the specification. The industry adjustment is performed by subtracting the industry median
for the corresponding two-digit SIC code industry group. The explanatory variable, Residual+
(Residual¯), takes on the value of the residual from the respective incentives model if the
residual is positive (negative), and zero otherwise. We include separate variables for positive
and negative residuals to allow for potential differences across firms that have more or fewer
option incentives than expected (Ittner et al., 2003). 
Controls represents a vector of firm characteristics that are expected to be associated
with Tobin’s Q. We use the log of market value of equity (Log(market value of equity))
measured at the end of the fiscal year to control for size effects.15 We use two variables to
control for growth opportunities. The first is R&D to Sales, which is defined as the three-year
average of the research and development expenditures to sales ratio. The second is Growth
Forecast, which is the I/B/E/S consensus forecast of long-term growth in earnings per share
measured four months after fiscal year-end. The advantage of this proxy is that it constitutes
an ex ante measure of the firm’s future performance. Following Shin and Stulz (2000), we
include the age of the firm, defined as the log of the number of years in which the firm has
data on CRSP, log(Firm Age). Based on the results in Gompers et al. (2003), we include two
variables to control for differences in corporate governance, Gov. Index and Gov. Indicator. 
Following the approach in Fama and MacBeth (1973), we estimate annual cross-
sectional  regressions  of  Eq.  (2)  and  report  the  mean  annual  coefficient  and  assess  its
significance using the corresponding time-series standard error. This approach is intended to
reduce measurement and sampling errors. As an alternative specification, we also estimate
Eq.  (2),  pooling  all  firm-year  observations,  and  we  include  three  calendar-year  indicator
variables to control for time effects. Table 5, Panel A presents the results of these regressions.
Focusing  on  the  Fama-MacBeth  results,  the  Residual+ coefficients  for  both
Executives and Employees are positive and significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the
coefficients indicate that a firm with a positive Executive (Employee) residual that is one
standard deviation above the median has a Tobin’s Q value that is 12 percent (10 percent)
higher  than  the  median  firm  in  its  industry.  The  results  indicate  that  these  valuation
differences  for  positive  incentive  residual  firms  continue  to  hold  one  year  later  as  the
Residual+ coefficients in the t+1 regressions are also significantly positive. The year t and
t+1 results  remain  virtually  unchanged  in  the  pooled  regressions.  None  of  the  Residual-
coefficients are significant in Panel A. These results indicate that firms with levels of option
incentives  well  below  the  average  amount  for  similar  firms  do  not  receive  a  valuation
discount  relative  to  similar  firms  with  small  (absolute)  amounts  of  unexpected  option
incentives (Portfolios 2, 3, and 4).
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15 Our inferences remain unchanged if we use the book value of assets as our proxy for size.As an alternative approach, we restrict the sample to only those firms in the Top and
Bottom  quintiles  of  firms  as  ranked  by  their  level  of  unexpected  Executive  (Employee)
option  incentives.  We  include  an  indicator  variable,  Top Executive (Employee) Portfolio,
which  takes  on  a  value  of  one  if  the  firm  belongs  to  the  Top  Portfolio  for  Executives
(Employees) and zero otherwise:
Tobin’s Qt (t+1) = α + β*Top Portfoliot + φ*Controlst + ε (3)
Controls consists of the same vector of control variables used in Panel A above. As
before, we estimate Eq. (3) using both Fama-MacBeth and pooled regressions. 
The results in Table 5, Panel B, for the time t Executive regressions show that firms
with  the  most  positive  incentive  residuals  have  significantly  higher  market  valuations
compared to firms with the lowest residuals. The mean coefficient is 0.273, indicating that
these firms experience a 27 percentage point valuation premium relative to the firms with the
most negative incentive residuals. The results are similar when we use the pooled sample,
where the coefficient equals 0.245 and is significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, these
coefficients are very close to the Executive Residual+ coefficients in Panel A. 
The results are similar for the year t+1 Executive regressions (Table 5, Panel C)
except that the significance level for the Top Executive Portfolio coefficient in the pooled
regression is reduced from the 5% level to the 10% level (p = 0.09). The two Top Executive
Portfolio coefficients are also slightly smaller than their year t counterparts (0.194 and 0.195
versus 0.273 and 0.245, respectively). These results indicate that the valuation effects of
option incentives are sustained for at least one year and are consistent with the abnormal
returns results in Table 4.
The results for the Employee regressions are similar to those for the Executives. The
Employee Residual+ coefficients  in  Table  5,  Panel  A,  are  all  positive  and  statistically
significant, and the year t and t+1 Top Portfolio coefficients in Panels B and C are all positive
and – with one exception – significant. This one exception is that the year t pooled coefficient
is no longer significant, although its magnitude is similar to the mean coefficient from the
annual regressions (0.132 and 0.112, respectively). Overall, the Tobin’s Q results indicate that
firms where Executives and Employees hold more option incentives than expected experience
significantly higher contemporaneous and future valuations compared to other firms.
The Gov. Index coefficient is not significantly different from zero in any of our
specifications.  This  result  is  unexpected  given  the  variable’s  significance  in  similar  tests
reported in Gompers et al. (2003).16 One possible explanation for the different results is that
the proxies for growth opportunities have already captured much of the information in the
governance  index  if  governance  structures  are  tailored  to  the  firm’s  growth  environment
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). To investigate this possibility, we reproduce the results of
Table VIII, column (1) in Gompers et al. (2003, page 127), using their specification, where
the sample is restricted to firms that have a governance index score:
Tobin’s Q = α + β*Gov. Index + φ*Controls + ε (4)
where Controls consists of the log of firm’s assets, the log of firm age, an indicator variable
that equals one if the firm is included in the S&P 500 index, and an indicator variable that
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16 However, it is consistent with the lack of significance for Gov. Index in the option incentive regressions.equals one if the firm was incorporated in Delaware. The average Gov. Index coefficient is
highly  significant  and  equals  –0.072,  which  is  similar  to  but  larger  than  the  average
coefficient of –0.043 in Gompers et al. (2003). However, when we add proxies for growth
opportunities (R&D to Sales and Growth Forecast) to Eq. (4), the average coefficient on the
governance index declines by almost 60 percent to –0.030, and its level of significance also
declines,  although  it  remains  significant  at  conventional  levels.  Thus,  the  difference  in
controls for growth opportunities appears to drive some but not all of the differences between
our results and those in Gompers et al. (2003).
5.3. Unexpected option incentives and accounting returns
In  this  section,  we  analyze  the  association  between  firms’  future  accounting
performance  and  unexpected  option  incentives.  This  approach  offers  two  advantages
compared to the previous market-based approaches. First, accounting returns are likely to
reflect the actual changes in operational performance that the option incentives are designed
to promote. Second, much speculation has arisen about the (absence of) efficiency of stock
prices  during  our  sample  period,  and  examining  an  accounting  measure  of  performance
provides  an  alternative  benchmark.  The  drawbacks  of  this  approach  include  accounting
profits’ susceptibility to manipulation and the possibility that the incentives to manipulate
earnings  are  increasing  in  the  absolute  level  of  option  incentives.  Nevertheless,  since
accounting manipulations typically reverse themselves relatively quickly, it is increasingly
difficult to artificially enhance firm performance over several consecutive periods. Consistent
results across the market- and accounting-based approaches are more likely to reflect the
actual  differences  in  firm  performance  as  opposed  to  measurement  errors  or  mis-
specification.
We measure accounting performance based on the future return on assets over the
next one and two years, inclusive. To the extent that the performance consequences of option
incentives  are  not  fully  reflected  in  net  income  within  two  years,  these  measures  will
underestimate their total impact. We follow the same methodological approach used in the
Tobin’s  Q  regressions  described  in  Section  5.2  above,  and  we  base  our  analyses  on  the
following two regression models, where firm subscripts are understood:
ROAt+1 (t+2) = α + β1*Executive Residualt
+ + β2*Executive Residualt
¯
+ β3*Employee Residualt
+ + β4*Employee Residualt
¯ + φ*Controlst + εt (5)
ROAt+1 (t+2) = α + β1*Top Portfoliot + φ*Controlst + εt (6)
The dependent variable in both regressions is the future industry-adjusted return on
assets (ROA) defined as operating income measured over the next one or two years deflated
by the current book value of assets. The industry adjustment is performed by subtracting the
industry  median  of  the  corresponding  two-digit  SIC  code  industry  group.  Residual+,
Residual¯, and Top Portfolio are defined above. The vector Controls includes a number of
control  variables  that  the  prior  literature  has  used.  In  addition  to  the  size  and  corporate
governance variables (log(Market Value of Equity), Gov. Index, Gov. Indicator), we include
three proxies for growth opportunities: R&D to Sales, Book to Market, and Growth Forecast.
We  include  the  standard  deviation  of  the  return  on  assets  (Five-year ROA Standard
Deviation), defined as the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income to beginning-
of-year assets for the period t to t-4, to control for any relation between firm risk and future
earnings (Core et al., 1999).
14Table 6, Panel A shows the results of the estimation of Eq. (5) using both the Fama-
MacBeth approach and a pooled specification that includes three calendar-year indicators in
the  regression.  The  findings  are  very  similar  for  the  two  return  periods  and  for  both
estimation methods. For both the Executives and the Employees, the one-year and two-year
Residual+ coefficients  are  positive  and  highly  significant.  The  two-year  coefficients  are
roughly twice the magnitude of the one-year coefficients, a proportion which is consistent
with options providing long-term incentives. These results are consistent with the Tobin’s Q
results discussed above, where firms with more option incentives than expected are valued
significantly higher. The results here suggest that one of the reasons these firms are valued
more highly is that they exhibit significantly better future earnings performance.17
While the Residual¯ coefficients in the Executive regressions are all insignificant,
they are positive and significant in both the one-year and two-year Employee regressions.
The  positive  coefficients  indicate  that  firms  with  negative  residuals  in  the  incentive
regressions  have  significantly  lower  future  ROA  compared  to  the  median  firm  in  their
industry. These results contrast with the Tobin’s Q results, where the Residual- coefficients
are all insignificant. 
We obtain similar results in estimating Eq. (6) when we restrict the sample to firms
in the top and bottom quintiles based on the incentive residuals. The results in Panels B and C
in Table 6 demonstrate that firms in the Top Portfolio produce significantly higher accounting
returns than firms in the Bottom Portfolio over the next one and two years. The results are
consistent  regardless  of  whether  firms  are  sorted  into  portfolios  based  on  the  Executive
residuals or the Employee residuals. Based on the mean coefficient of the annual regressions,
the  estimated  difference  in  subsequent  year’s  ROA  between  the  two  extreme  incentive
portfolios is 3.9% (4.9%) for the Executives (Employees).18 These amounts are economically
significant considering that the median ROA over the next year in our sample is 11.1%.
In summary, the results from the three analyses discussed above present a consistent
description  of  the  relation  between  the  unexpected  level  of  option  incentives  and  firm
performance. After controlling for the economic determinants of option incentives, we find
that  firms  with  unexpectedly  high  levels  of  incentives  exhibit  significantly  higher
performance and that this higher level of performance is sustained for up to 30 months. This
sustained association between option incentives and firm performance suggests that options
provide long-lasting incentives, perhaps through their vesting requirements. We do not find
much evidence to suggest that firms with levels of option incentives below the average level
for similar firms perform significantly worse than similar firms with small (absolute) levels
of unexpected option incentives. The Employee results suggest that, in aggregate, incentives
provided to lower ranked employees can significantly affect firm performance, and these
results lend some support to the practice of providing option-based incentives below the top
executive ranks.19
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17 These results are generally consistent with those in Hayes and Schaefer (2000), Hanlon et al. (2003), and
Ittner et al. (2003). 
18 An  alternative  explanation  is  that  firms  with  excess  option  incentives  are  more  likely  to  manage  their
earnings upwards.  We believe that this explanation can, at best, only explain a small part of the association
we document, given the extremely large amount of manipulation necessary to lead the differences in ROA
implied  by  the  coefficient  estimates.    Furthermore,  we  expect  that  earnings  management  would  not  be
related to the option incentives held by Employees, so the significant Employee coefficients are inconsistent
with this explanation.
19 This interpretation contrasts with Hall and Murphy (2003) and Oyer and Schaefer (2002), who suggest that
providing options for non-executive employees is either inefficient given risk aversion or ineffective in
providing meaningful incentives.  Our results do not provide evidence on the efficiency of option-based
incentives versus other types of equity incentives.5.4. Artifact of the bull market?
The level of unexpected incentives is based on options outstanding at the end of
fiscal years between 1996 and 1999, a period characterized by rapidly rising stock prices.
Many market commentators have speculated that stock prices were irrationally high during
this “bubble” period (Ofek and Richardson, 2003). If the degree of any market mispricing
were positively associated with the level of unexpected option incentives, then our results
may be an artifact of our sample period and thus, are not generalizable to other time periods.
Such  a  positive  correlation  is  not  unreasonable  if  the  incentive  residuals  are  positively
associated with the absolute intensity of options use, since a widespread belief holds that the
mispricing  (as  judged  by  post-bubble  returns)  was  concentrated  in  firms  and  industries
characterized by high options use (Keating et al., 2003). We note that the ROA analyses are
not affected by the degree of market mispricing.
We do not believe that our tests are unduly affected by any possible mispricing
during the late 1990s. Since we measure returns over a 30-month period, many of our return
observations take place during the “market correction” period that began in April 2000 (the
last monthly return observation is for December 2002). To provide additional evidence on
this matter, we replicate the abnormal returns tests described in Section 5.1 and we exclude
firms whose return accumulation period ends before April 2000. The untabulated findings are
essentially  unchanged  from  those  reported  in  Table  4.  We  also  replicate  our  Tobin’s  Q
analyses where Tobin’s Q is measured at time t+1 and the sample is limited to firm-year
observations where Tobin’s Qt+1 is measured after the end of March 2000. Untabulated results
show that the Residual+ coefficients for both Executives and Employees are positive and
significant, consistent with our previous findings. The Residual- coefficients continue to be
insignificant. Thus, it is unlikely that our results are just an artifact of mispricing during our
sample period unless the relative amount of mispricing has continued through the end of
2002, a possibility we consider highly unlikely.
5.5. Direction of causality
Above  we  describe  empirical  evidence  of  a  positive  association  between  the
unexpected level of option incentives and firm performance. Our evidence is consistent with
the joint hypothesis that options provide employees with incentives that lead to increased
future performance, and the incentive effects of stock options are only gradually incorporated
into stock prices. In this section, we provide some preliminary evidence on the issue of
causality.  These  analyses  are  inherently  limited  because  our  setting  is  not  a  natural
experiment with random selection.
Kole (1996) suggests that the causality does not run from option incentives to future
performance but rather from (anticipated) future performance to option incentives. That is,
while option incentives do not affect firm performance, firms that anticipate good future
performance tend to use options more intensively, i.e., have positive incentive residuals. To
investigate  this  reverse-causality  explanation,  we  require  an ex ante proxy  for  the  firm’s
expectations about its future returns. We use analyst forecasts of earnings growth (Growth
Forecast) as a proxy for the firm’s unobservable information about its future performance.
The use of this proxy assumes that managers pass on their private information to analysts,
who  then  incorporate  it  into  their  forecasts.  While  it  is  a  noisy  proxy,  we  note  that
communications  with  managers  are  a  key  source  of  private  information  for  analysts
(Mahoney, 1991; Marcus and Wallace, 1991). 
16We focus our analysis on the Executives since any “reverse causality” effect will be
strongest for the Executives as they exert far more influence over the form and timing of their
compensation and have greater access to private information relative to Employees.20 If the
reverse  causality  explanation  is  correct,  then  the  residuals  at  time t should  be  positively
associated with the lagged growth forecasts. We use the following regression specification to
examine this prediction, where Residual refers to the residual from the Executive incentive
regressions.  We  include  the  lagged  values  of  Residual to  control  for  other,  firm-specific
determinants  of  option  incentive  intensity.  By  construction,  the  incentive  residual  in  a
particular year will be orthogonal to the contemporaneous Growth Forecast since Growth
Forecast is one of the explanatory variables in the incentives model.
Residualit = α + β1*Growth Forecastit-1 + β2*Growth Forecastit-2 + γ1*Residualit-1
+ γ2*Residualit-2 + εit (7)
Table  7  presents  the  results  from  estimating  Eq.  (7).  After  controlling  for  the
unexpected level of option incentives held by Executives in the two prior years, we find no
significant  association  between  the  unexpected  level  of  option  incentives  and  prior
expectations about future earnings growth. The β1 and β2 coefficients are not statistically
different from zero, either individually or jointly, and neither is the sum of the coefficients.
Thus, we find no evidence suggesting that firms who “opportunistically” increase their option
incentives in anticipation of good future performance drive the positive relation between
option  incentives  and  future  firm  performance.  While  not  conclusive,  this  finding  is  not
consistent with reverse causality driving our empirical results.
6. Relation to alternative economic theories
In this section, we discuss how the results from our empirical analyses pertain to
alternative economic theories about how the level of option incentives is determined within
firms. This discussion, of course, is conditional on the reliability of the evidence presented in
Section  5  and  should  be  interpreted  accordingly.  We  assess  the  extent  to  which  the
predictions  from  the  Optimal  Contracting  Hypothesis  with  Transaction  Costs  (OCH-TC),
the Rent  Extraction  Hypothesis  (REH),  and  what  we  designate  the  Dynamic  Evolution
Hypothesis (DEH), which is suggested in Core and Guay (2001) and further discussed in
Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003), are consistent with our evidence. Evidence distinguishing
among the three hypotheses facilitates the interpretation of our results.
According to the Optimal Contracting Hypothesis (OCH), which is derived from
agency  theory,  firms  continuously  adjust  the  level  of  incentives  so  that  their  employees
always hold the optimal level of incentives, where the marginal cost of the incentives just
equals their marginal benefits (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).21 A variation of the OCH, which
we call the Optimal Contracting Hypothesis with Transaction Costs (OCH-TC), suggests that
firms are only in equilibrium on average, instead of at every point in time (Zingales, 1998;
Core and Larcker, 2002). According to this view, transaction costs associated with the re-
17
20 The results are qualitatively unchanged when we base the analysis on Employees.
21 The OCH implies that no association will exist between the residuals and firms’ stock-based performance
because the residuals from the incentives models are only the result of measurement and/or specification
errors.contracting process will prevent firms from immediately re-contracting whenever the actual
level of incentives deviates from the optimal level. While employees of particular firms at
particular times will hold non-optimal levels of incentives, employees will hold on average
the correct quantity of incentives across firms and across time.
Under  the  OCH-TC,  the  fitted  values  (residuals)  from  the  incentive  regressions
represent (deviations from) the optimal level of option incentives if the incentive models are
correctly specified. Firms further from the optimum are expected to perform relatively worse
than firms nearer to the optimum. This under-performance is expected to occur whether the
level  of  incentives  is  above  or  below  the  optimal  level  and  whether  the  Executives  or
Employees hold the “wrong” level of incentives or not. 
According to the Rent Extraction Hypothesis (REH) developed in Bebchuk et al.
(2002), executives frequently use their power to extract economic rents at the expense of
shareholders, and the “excessive” granting of stock options is one of the primary means by
which they extract these rents. While not denying that equity-based incentives can provide a
cost-effective means of reducing agency costs, they argue that the actual level of incentives
goes well beyond the optimal level of incentives. Under the REH, the fitted values from the
Executive incentive regressions represent the optimal level of incentives plus the average
amount of rent extraction for similar firms. Positive (negative) residuals result when the top
executives have extracted more (less) rents than average, and firms with positive (negative)
Executive residuals are thus expected to be further away from (closer to) the optimal level, on
average. The REH implies that firms with positive Executive residuals should perform worse
than firms with negative Executive residuals. As top executives are not expected to use their
power  to  extract  rents  for  lower  level  employees,  the  level  of  option  incentives  for
Employees should be set optimally, subject to transaction costs. Accordingly, positive and
negative residuals for Employees are expected to demonstrate the same negative associations
with firm performance as under the OCH-TC. 
A third alternative suggests that most firms were still experimenting and learning
about the optimal level of option incentives as their use of options was evolving dynamically
over the sample period (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Liang and Weisbenner, 2002). Core and
Guay (2001) find that firms with unexpectedly high levels of non-executive option incentives
tend to grant unexpectedly high levels of option incentives the following year. They suggest
one possible explanation for this unexpected result (unexpected from the viewpoint that firms
were already in equilibrium): that firms are not yet in equilibrium; that is, Employees at the
average firm do not hold enough option incentives.22 This explanation is plausible as broad-
based option plans were still a relatively new phenomenon during our sample period. In this
case, firms with above (below) average levels of option incentives will be closer to (farther
from) the optimal level and should perform relatively better (worse). 
Figure 1 summarizes the expected relation between the unexpected level of option
incentives (after controlling for their economic determinants) and firm performance under
each  hypothesis.  While  acknowledging  that  our  setting  does  not  represent  a  natural
experiment, and thus does not provide direct evidence, we consider how well our evidence
conforms to the predictions of each hypothesis. Our results are generally inconsistent with the
OCH-TC since we find that firms with positive Executive and Employee residuals tend to
18
22 “One scenario that is consistent with our results is a type of leader/follower game in which firms gradually
decide to grant options deeper into the organization, and the firms that begin this process earlier have more
options outstanding and make larger grants each year” (Core and Guay, 2001, p. 277).perform significantly better in terms of abnormal returns, market valuation, and accounting
returns. In fact, only two of our results are even moderately consistent with the OCH-TC.
First,  firms  with  negative  Employee  residuals  experience  significantly  lower  future
accounting returns.23 Second, the intercepts in the abnormal returns regressions are lower for
the Bottom Portfolio 1 compared to Portfolio 3. Portfolio 3 consists of the firms with the
residuals  closest  to  zero  and  thus,  these  firms  should  be  closest  to  the  optimal  level  of
incentives under the OCH-TC. However, the differences in abnormal returns between the two
portfolios are not significant. Overall, our results do not conform to the basic implications of
the OCH-TC.
While the central implication of the REH is that firms with positive residuals should
perform significantly worse than firms with negative residuals, our results consistently show
that positive residual firms outperform negative residual firms. In not a single regression do
the firms with the highest levels of unexpected option incentives perform worse than their
counterparts  with  either  the  most  negative  residuals  or  the  smallest  (absolute)  residuals
(Portfolio 3). These results contradict what would be expected if the REH held in practice.
Thus, our evidence is not in accordance with the REH.
Overall, the evidence conforms most to the implications of the Dynamic Evolution
Hypothesis, which posits that most employees hold too few option incentives. The DEH
implies that firms with the most positive (negative) residuals are the closest to (farthest from)
the optimal level of incentives and should therefore perform relatively better (worse). The
results for the positive residuals conform to the DEH for both the Executives and Employees.
However,  the  evidence  does  not  completely  accord  with  the  DEH.  Firms  with  the  most
negative residuals are expected to be further from the optimum compared to firms with the
smallest (absolute) residuals and are expected to perform worse. However, the coefficients
for the negative residuals in the Tobin’s Q regressions and for the Executives in the ROA
regressions are not significantly different from zero. With respect to the Executives, these
findings  are  incongruent  with  the  business  press’s  numerous  statements  that  executive
compensation  is  “excessive,”  “out-of-control,”  and  “harmful  to  shareholders.”  While  our
results do not rule out the possibility that some executives hold “too many” option incentives,
they are – taken at face value – consistent with the average executive (and employee) holding
too few option incentives. 
7. Summary and conclusion
We examine the performance consequences of option incentives for a broad sample
of  firms  between  1996  and  1999.  We  measure  incentive  effects  of  options  as  the  dollar
change in the option’s value for a 1% change in stock price and perform our tests separately
for option incentives held by the top-5 Executives and by all other Employees. We examine
the  relation  between  the  unexpected  level  of  option  incentives  and  firm  performance
measured by future abnormal returns, future return on assets, and current and future firm
valuation (Tobin’s Q). After controlling for the economic determinants of option incentives,
our results consistently show that firm performance is significantly and positively related to
the extent to which both Executives and Employees hold more option incentives than the
average firm with similar economic characteristics. Our results are consistent across all three
measures of firm performance.
19
23 This result also conforms to the REH and DEH.As with all empirical work in this area, our results are subject to several caveats.
First, our sample period is relatively short, and the associations we document may not hold in
future time periods. Second, we assume that the option incentive models adequately capture
the economic determinants of option incentives. To the extent that this is not the case, our
inferences may be spurious. However, our empirical methodology is designed to minimize
this possibility. Third, we do not take other equity-based incentives (restricted stock, stock
appreciation rights, warrants, etc.) into account apart from stock options. If these other forms
of compensation are economically significant and are correlated with the option incentive
residuals, then our results may be biased. Despite these potential shortcomings, we believe
that our findings contribute new evidence on the performance consequences of option-based
incentives. 
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Log (Option Incentives per  Predicted Sign Executive Employee
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Log (Sales) + 0.567 *** 0.059 ***
Log (Idiosyncratic Risk) + 0.079 0.448 ***
Book to Market - -2.038 *** -2.065 ***
R&D to Sales + 1.724 *** 2.858 ***
Growth Forecast + 4.295 *** 3.258 ***
FCF Problem+ 8.784 *** -
Gov. Index + -0.006 -
Gov. Indicator 0.087 -
Growth Options per Employee + - 0.410 ***
Product Diversification - - -0.199 ***
Intersegment Sales + - 1.855 **
Geographic Diversification ? - 0.173 ***
Executive Residual + - 0.507 ***
Observations 2,479  2,479 
Adjusted-R2 0.66  0.75 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
The sample is based on 2,479 firm-year observations between 1996 and 1999.  The reported results are based
on a pooled, cross-sectional regression that includes 55 two-digit SIC industry indicator variables, three year
indicator variables, and a constant that are not reported. The dependent variable is the log of the Option
Incentives per Executive or Employee, depending on the specification, where Option Incentives measures the
dollar change in the value of the portfolio of options due to a one percent change in the stock price based on
the Black-Scholes “delta.”  Executive Residual is the residual from the Executive regression in column 1. The
definitions for the other varibles are in Table 2.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively, based on a two-sided test.
27Table 4
Abnormal Returns Regression for Unexpected Option Incentive Quintiles
Panel A
Executives: Equally-weighted monthly returns
Portfolio α RMRF SMB HML UMD Adj.-R2
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Top: 5 0.871*** 1.342*** 0.381*** 0.543*** -0.203 *** 0.87
4 0.654*** 1.199*** 0.296*** 0.502*** -0.220 *** 0.93
3 0.568*** 1.159*** 0.212*** 0.589*** -0.175 *** 0.93
2 0.557*** 1.086*** 0.289*** 0.609*** -0.147 *** 0.91
Bottom: 1 0.510*** 1.105*** 0.351*** 0.613*** -0.189 *** 0.93
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Top – Bottom0.361* 0.237*** 0.030 -0.070 -0.015 0.30
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Employees: Equally-weighted monthly returns
Portfolio α RMRF SMB HML UMD Adj.-R2
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Top: 5 1.184*** 1.261*** 0.328*** 0.392*** -0.155 *** 0.86
4 0.707*** 1.160*** 0.243*** 0.490*** -0.167 *** 0.92
3 0.491*** 1.080*** 0.260*** 0.584*** -0.206 *** 0.90
2 0.380*** 1.167*** 0.266*** 0.700*** -0.226 *** 0.94
Bottom: 1 0.404** 1.223*** 0.432*** 0.688*** -0.181 *** 0.92
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Top – Bottom0.780*** 0.038 -0.103* -0.296*** 0.026 0.23
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Panel B
Executives: Value-weighted monthly returns
Portfolio α RMRF SMB HML UMD Adj.-R2
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Top: 5 0.535*** 1.087*** -0.121*** -0.071 -0.223 *** 0.91
4 0.782*** 0.987*** -0.169*** -0.082 -0.401 *** 0.83
3 0.423 1.108*** -0.257*** -0.027 -0.268 *** 0.83
2 0.294 0.871*** -0.087* 0.335*** -0.053 * 0.77
Bottom: 1 0.287 0.939*** -0.246*** 0.320*** -0.119 *** 0.82
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Top – Bottom0.248 0.148** 0.125* -0.391*** -0.103 ** 0.51
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
28Table 4 (continued)
Abnormal Returns Regression for Unexpected Option Incentive Quintiles
Employees:                                    Value-weighted monthly returns
Portfolio α RMRF SMB HML UMD Adj.-R2
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Top: 5 0.644*** 0.927*** -0.228*** -0.106* -0.222 *** 0.86
4 0.585** 1.021*** -0.219*** -0.018 -0.241 *** 0.84
3 0.402* 1.038*** -0.096* 0.280*** -0.258 *** 0.85
2 0.314 1.018*** -0.158*** 0.122** -0.240 *** 0.89
Bottom: 1 0.269 1.050*** -0.098* 0.231*** -0.160 *** 0.83
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Top – Bottom0.374 † -0.123 -0.130* -0.337*** -0.062 0.11
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
† Significant at the 0.14 level.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
In Panel A, we estimate Eq. (1), the four-factor regression of equally-weighted monthly stock returns for five
portfolios of firms ranked by the level of unexpected option incentives, which are measured by the residuals
from the annual Executive or Employee option incentive models, depending on the specification.  In Panel B,
the analyses are based on  value-weighted monthly returns. At the end of June for each year 1997-2000, we
rank firms based on the residuals from the previous year’s option incentive model. Firms are grouped into five
equal-sized portfolios where the Top Portfolio consists of the firms with the most positive residuals and the
Bottom Portfolio consists of the firms with the most negative residuals. For each portfolio, we measure the
monthly  buy-and-hold  returns  for  the  following  30  months.  Each  regression  contains  120  monthly
observations. The dependent variable is the monthly portfolio return minus the contemporaneous one-month
Treasury bill rate. The independent variables consist of four factors: The market factor (RMRF) is the monthly
market return minus the one-month Treasury bill rate. The size factor (SMB: small minus big) is the zero-
investment return on a portfolio that mimics the factor in returns related to size. The book-to-market factor
(HML: high minus low) is the zero-investment return on a portfolio that mimics the factor in returns related to
the book-to-market ratio.  The momentum factor (UMD: up minus down) is the average return on two high
prior return portfolios minus the average return on two low prior return portfolios that mimics the momentum
factor in stock returns.  Details about the factors can be found at Kenneth French’s web site.  The rows labeled
Top – Bottom contain the results for a zero-investment strategy that buys the Top Portfolio and sells short the
Bottom Portfolio.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based
on a two-sided test.
29Table 5
Tobin’s Q Regressions
Panel A Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Qt Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Qt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fama-MacBeth Pooled Fama-MacBeth Pooled
Regressions Regression Regressions Regression
––––––––––– –––––––––––– ––––––––––––– –––––––––––
Explanatory variables at time t Mean Coef. Coef. Mean Coef. Coef.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Executive Residual+   0.282*** 0.294*** 0.205** 0.224 ***
Executive Residual¯ 0.030 -0.003 0.063 0.038
Employee Residual+ 0.232** 0.209** 0.231** 0.218 ***
Employee Residual¯ -0.071 -0.066 0.005 0.010
Log (Market Value of Equity) 0.360*** 0.398*** 0.314*** 0.327 ***
R&D to Sales 2.756 2.210*** 3.712*** 3.030 ***
Growth Forecast 12.56*** 12.70*** 9.327*** 9.889 ***
Log (Firm Age) 0.015 0.006 -0.024 -0.018
Gov. Index 0.012 0.009 0.005 0.004





Restricting the sample to the Top and Bottom Portfolios:
Executives Employees
––––––––––––––––––––––––– ––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fama-MacBeth Pooled Fama-MacBeth Pooled
Regressions Regression Regressions Regression
Dependent variable: ––––––––––– –––––––––––– ––––––––––––– –––––––––––
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Qt Mean Coef. Coef. Mean Coef. Coef.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Top Portfolio 0.273*** 0.245** 0.112** 0.132
Log (Market Value of Equity) 0.396*** 0.430*** 0.377*** 0.430 ***
R&D to Sales 2.715 1.862*** 3.034 2.703 ***
Growth Forecast 12.30*** 12.66*** 12.95*** 12.61 ***
Log (Firm Age) -0.114 -0.129 -0.060* -0.104
Gov. Index 0.021 0.019 0.021 0.025









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fama-MacBeth Pooled Fama-MacBeth Pooled
Regressions Regression Regressions Regression
Dependent variable: ––––––––––– –––––––––––– ––––––––––––– –––––––––––
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Qt+1 Mean Coef. Coef. Mean Coef. Coef.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Top Portfolio 0.194*** 0.195* 0.334*** 0.358 ***
Log (Market Value of Equity) 0.334*** 0.346*** 0.315*** 0.329 ***
R&D to Sales 3.260** 2.266*** 3.377* 2.789 ***
Growth Forecast 8.762*** 9.977*** 8.981*** 9.993 ***
Log (Firm Age) -0.123 -0.097 -0.115*** -0.106
Gov. Index -0.010 -0.009 0.005 0.009




The sample is based on 2,479 firm-year observations between 1996 and 1999. Tobin’s Q is defined as the
ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets measured at time t or t+1 depending on the
specification. Market value of assets is the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities. 
The  market  value  of  equity  is  measured  at  the  fiscal  year  end.  The  industry  adjustment  is  performed  by
substracting the industry median of the corresponding two-digit SIC code industry group.
Panel A reports summary statistics from the estimation of Eq. (2) of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q on the
residuals  from  the  Executive  and  Employee  option  incentive  models  and  control  variables.  Executive
(Employee)  Residual+ takes  on  the  value  of  the  residual  from  the  Executive  (Employee)  option  incentive
regression if that value is positive, and zero otherwise. Executive (Employee) Residual- is defined similarly.
Market value of equity is market capitalization measured at the fiscal year end. Firm Age is the number of years
since the firm’s initial public offering. The other control variables are defined in Table 2. The Fama-MacBeth
regressions report the mean coefficient from annual regressions where the constant is not reported. Standard
errors are based on the time-series standard deviation of the annual coefficient estimates. The pooled regressions
include three year indicator variables and a constant that are not reported.
Panels B and C report the results of estimating Eq. (3) where the sample is restricted to the top and bottom
unexpected option incentive quintiles. Top Portfolio is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the
firm’s residual from the Executive or Employee incentive regression, depending on the specification, is in the
most positive quintile, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in Panel B (C) is the industry-adjusted
Tobin’s Q at time t (t+1). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively,
based on a two-sided test.
31Table 6
Return on Assets Regressions
Panel A
Industry-adjusted ROA t+1 Industry-adjusted ROAt+2
––––––––––––––––––––––––– ––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fama-MacBeth Pooled Fama-MacBeth Pooled
Regressions Regression Regressions Regression
––––––––––– ––––––––––– ––––––––––––– –––––––––––
Explanatory variables at time t Mean Coef. Coef. Mean Coef. Coef.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Executive Residual+ 0.035 *** 0.036 *** 0.030 *** 0.031***
Executive Residual¯ 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.005
Employee Residual+ 0.028 *** 0.034 *** 0.031 *** 0.036***
Employee Residual¯ 0.023 *** 0.019 ** 0.020 *** 0.016*
Five-year ROA Standard Deviation -0.037 -0.183 *** -0.098 -0.231***
Book to Market -0.369 *** -0.342 *** -0.310 *** -0.285***
Log (Market Value of Equity) -0.006 *** -0.009 *** 0.002 0.000
R&D to Sales -0.755 *** -0.628 *** -0.751 *** -0.626***
Growth Forecast 0.291 ** 0.301 *** 0.287 ** 0.294***
Gov. Index -0.003 *** -0.003 -0.002 ** -0.002







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fama-MacBeth Pooled Fama-MacBeth Pooled
Regressions Regression Regressions Regression
Dependent variable: ––––––––––– ––––––––––– ––––––––––––– –––––––––––
Industry-adjusted ROA t+1 Mean Coef. Coef. Mean Coef. Coef.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Top Portfolio 0.039 *** 0.041 *** 0.049 ** 0.045***
Five-year ROA Standard Deviation -0.104 -0.176 -0.100 -0.174
Book to Market -0.325 *** -0.311 *** -0.323 *** -0.307***
Log (Market Value of Equity) -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.005
R&D to Sales -0.925 *** -0.781 *** -0.915 *** -0.771***
Growth Forecast 0.310 * 0.272 ** 0.326 ** 0.291***
Gov. Index  -0.005 ** -0.005 * -0.005 ** -0.004*









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fama-MacBeth Pooled Fama-MacBeth Pooled
Regressions Regression Regressions Regression
Dependent variable: ––––––––––– ––––––––––– ––––––––––––– –––––––––––
Industry-adjusted ROA t+2 Mean Coef. Coef. Mean Coef. Coef.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Top Portfolio 0.034 *** 0.035 ** 0.057 *** 0.054***
Five-year ROA Standard Deviation -0.168 -0.244 ** -0.166 *** -0.244**
Book to Market -0.281 *** -0.268 *** -0.281 *** -0.267***
Log (Market Value of Equity) 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.002
R&D to Sales -0.916 *** -0.767 *** -0.909 *** -0.758***
Growth Forecast 0.302 * 0.265 ** 0.317 *** 0.281***
Gov. Index -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 *** -0.004




The sample consists of 2,479 firm-year observations between 1996 and 1999. ROA is the accounting return
on assets, defined as the sum of operating income over the next one or two years inclusive, depending on the
specification, divided by the end of current year book value of assets. The industry adjustment is performed by
substracting the industry median of the corresponding two-digit SIC code industry group.
Panel A reports summary statistics from the estimation of Eq. (5) of either industry-adjusted ROAt+1 or
ROAt+2 on the residuals from the Executive and Employee option incentive models and control variables.
Executive  (Employee)  Residual+ takes  on  the  value  of  the  residual  from  the  Executive  (Employee)  option
incentive regression if that value is positive, or zero otherwise. Executive (Employee) Residual- is defined
similarly. Five-year ROA Standard Deviation is the standard deviation of operating income over beginning-of-
year  assets  for  the  years  t to  t-4.  The  other  control  variables  are  defined  in  Table  2.  The  Fama-MacBeth
regressions report the mean coefficient from the annual regressions where the constant is not reported. Standard
errors are based on the time-series standard deviation of the annual coefficient estimates. The pooled regressions
include three year indicator variables and a constant that are not reported. 
Panels B and C report the results of estimating Eq. (6) where the sample is restricted to the top and bottom
unexpected option incentive quintiles. Top Portfolio is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the
firm’s residual from the Executive or Employee incentive regression, depending on the specification, is in the
most positive quintile, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in Panel B (C) is the industry-adjusted
ROAt+1 (ROAt+2).  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively,
based on a two-sided test.
33Table 7
Direction of Causality between Performance and Unexpected Option Incentives
Executives Employees
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Executive Residualt Coefficient Employee Residualt Coefficient
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Growth Forecastt-1 0.237  Growth Forecastt-1 - 0.557 
(0.379) (0.455)
Growth Forecastt-2 - 0.005  Growth Forecastt-2 0.454 
(0.369) (0.438)
Executive Residualt-1 0.663 *** Employee Residualt-1 0.693 ***
(0.032) (0.037)
Executive Residualt-1 0.165 *** Employee Residualt-2 0.158 ***
(0.031) (0.037)
Constant - 0.030  Constant 0.015 
(0.032) (0.039)
Observations 1,021  Observations 1,021 
Adjusted-R2 0.68  Adjusted-R2 0.58 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Tests on coefficients: Tests on coefficients:
Growth Forecastt-1 = 0 and Growth Forecastt-2 = 0 Growth Forecastt-
341 = 0 and Growth Forecastt-2 = 0 F(2,  1016) = 0.80 F(2,  1016) =
0.75
Prob > F = 0.45 Prob > F = 0.47
Growth Forecastt-1 + Growth Forecastt-2 = 0 Growth Forecastt-1 + Growth Forecastt-2 = 0
F(1,  1016) = 1.53 F(1,  1016) = 0.20
Prob > F = 0.22 Prob > F = 0.66
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
The sample consists of 1,021 firm-year observations between 1998 and 1999.  The dependent variables are the
residual from the year t Executive or Employee option incentive model, depending on the specification.  The
independent  variables  are  the  years  t-1 and  t-2 values  of  Growth  Forecast  and  two  lags  of  the  dependent
variable.  Growth Forecast is the I/B/E/S consensus forecast of long-term growth in earnings per share measured
four months after fiscal year end.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.  ***, **, *
indicate  statistical  significance  at  the  .01,  .05,  .10  levels,  respectively,  based  on  a  two-sided  test.  F-tests
regarding the joint significance of the Growth Forecast coefficients are presented below the regression results.
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